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HEARSAY AND ABUSE: WHERE PAST IS PRESENT 
The Hon. Andrea M. Leahy and Jared A. McClain, Esq.* 
 Abuse takes on many forms.  Mental abuse, unlike physical abuse, 
leaves no visible trace.  And, unlike a piece of carved wood that lays 
bare the work of a knife’s whittling, when the object of abuse is a 
human being, layers of shame, fear, and trauma often obscure the 
imprint of physical and mental abuse.  Consequently, in many cases 
of abuse, proof is problematic.    
Many criminal and civil actions involve people, either as parties or 
witnesses, who are suffering from some form of abuse, trauma, or 
both.1  Indeed, incidences of domestic abuse2 and human trafficking,3 
* We would like to extend our sincere thanks and gratitude to Adam Curfman, Esq., for
his help editing this article.
1. See Jessica Emerson & Alison Aminzadeh, Left Behind: How the Absence of a
Federal Vacatur Law Disadvantages Survivors of Human Trafficking, 16 U. MD. L.J. 
RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 239, 241, 245–46, 257 (2016); Ron Cassie,
Children of the Night: Sex Trafficking is Maryland’s Dirty Open Secret., BALT. MAG.,
Mar. 2017, at 86, 88–89.
2. As of October 1, 2018, the Maryland Code defines abuse as:
(1) “Abuse” means any of the following acts:
(i) an act that causes serious bodily harm;
(ii) an act that places a person eligible for relief in fear of
imminent serious bodily harm;
(iii) assault in any degree;
(iv) rape or sexual offense under §§ 3-303 through 3-308 of the
Criminal Law Article or attempted rape or sexual offense in any
degree;
(v) false imprisonment;
(vi) stalking under § 3-802 of the Criminal Law Article; or
(vii) revenge porn under § 3-809 of the Criminal Law Article.
(2) (i) If the person for whom relief is sought is a child, “abuse”
may also include abuse of a child, as defined in Title 5, Subtitle 7
of this article.
(ii) Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to prohibit
reasonable punishment, including reasonable corporal
punishment, in light of the age and condition of the child, from
being performed by a parent or stepparent of the child.
Family Law – Domestic Violence – Definition of Abuse, ch. 501,
2018 Md. Laws (West) (to be codified at MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW §5-501(b)).
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for example, occur in Maryland at staggering rates.4  CBS Baltimore 
reported in 2017 that “[t]he Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention estimates more than half of Maryland women will be 
impacted by sexual violence in their lifetime.”5   
Human trafficking includes sex trafficking, forced labor, and 
domestic servitude.6  The Baltimore Sun reported in 2017 that 
“Maryland has become a ‘hot spot[]’” for human trafficking, “a 
destination for traffickers using Interstate 95 to connect victims to 
Baltimore, Washington, Philadelphia and New York . . . .”7  The year 
prior, the Maryland Judicial Council formed the Joint Workgroup on 
Human Trafficking, chaired by the Honorable Barbara Waxman, 
which it tasked with “developing and implementing plans to educate 
judges, magistrates, appropriate judiciary staff, and justice partners 
on issues related to human trafficking.”8  Jessica Emerson, the 
3. A yearly report published by the U.S. Department of State, defines sex trafficking as
follows: “When an adult engages in a commercial sex act, such as prostitution, as the
result of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion or any combination of such means,
that person is a victim of trafficking.”  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
REPORT 17 (2017), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/271339.pdf.
4. See Devin Bartolotta, New Numbers Show Maryland has High Rate of Domestic
Violence, CBS BALT. (Oct. 25, 2017, 7:23 PM), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2017/
10/25/domestic-violence/ (describing high rates of domestic abuse); Cassie, supra
note 1, at 87–88 (describing high rates of human trafficking).  Human trafficking is
prohibited pursuant to MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-303 (West 2018).
5. Bartolotta, supra note 4.  According to Maryland’s 2015 Uniform Crime Report, there
were over 15,300 incidences of domestic violence in Maryland that year.  MD. STATE 
POLICE, CRIME IN MD.: 2015 UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 51 (2016), http://mdsp.
maryland.gov/Document%20Downloads/Crime%20in%20Maryland%202015%20Un
iform%20Crime%20Report.pdf.
6. Emerson & Aminzadeh, supra note 1, at 243.
7. Lorraine Mirabella, University of Baltimore Law Students Help Trafficking Victims
Escape Their Past, BALT. SUN (July 8, 2017, 8:29 AM), http://www.baltimoresun.com
/business/bs-bz-human-trafficking-prevention-20170708-story.html; see also Cassie,
supra note 1, at 88 (“‘Maryland is a hot spot of trafficking.  It’s that simple,’ says
Maryland State Police Sgt. Deborah Flory, who oversees the agency’s two-person
Child Recovery Unit.  ‘That’s because of I-95, I-70, and BWI Airport, and the mix of
wealth and poverty, which is one of the things that makes young women
vulnerable.’”).
8. MD. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, MARYLAND JUDICIAL COUNCIL – JOINT WORKGROUP ON
HUMAN TRAFFICKING (2016), https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/import
/judicialcouncil/pdfs/workgroups/humantrafficking.pdf.  The Joint Workgroup on
Human Trafficking’s report on November 21, 2017, noted “that the group, Protected
Innocence, conducts a comprehensive assessment on each state’s response to human
trafficking and offers a corresponding grade.  Maryland’s grade improved from an ‘F’
in 2011 to a ‘B’ in 2017.”  MD. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, MARYLAND JUDICIAL COUNCIL:
MINUTES NOVEMBER 21, 2017, at 2 (2017), https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/
import/judicialcouncil/pdfs/minutes/20171121minutes.pdf.  In 2007, the U.S.
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Director of the Human Trafficking Prevention Project at the 
University of Baltimore School of Law, explained in a recent article 
that human trafficking victims often get caught up in the criminal 
justice system, compounding the effects of their trauma.9  She 
explains: 
The impact of having been trafficked on the psychological 
and physical well-being of victims combined with these 
limitations on access to basic needs leaves victims of 
trafficking convicted of criminal offenses vulnerable and 
without the stability they so desperately need as they work 
to heal from trauma and rebuild their lives.10   
Cases involving victims of abuse present a special challenge for 
lawyers and judges alike.  On one side are the constitutional rights of 
the accused, and on the other, are the often-tangled complexities 
surrounding an abuse victim’s inconsistent testimony11—or silence.12  
Attorney’s Office, the Attorney General of Maryland, and the State’s Attorney for 
Baltimore City formed the Maryland Human Trafficking Task Force (MHTTF) “to 
serve as the lead investigative, prosecutorial, and victim services coordinating body 
for anti-human trafficking activity in the State of Maryland.”  About the Task Force, 
MD. HUMAN TRAFFICKING TASK FORCE, http://www.mdhumantrafficking.org/mhttf/
(last visited Nov. 10, 2018).  MHTTF’s most recent victim identification report, from
2014, identified 396 survivors of human trafficking in Maryland (up from 217 in
2013).  MD. HUMAN TRAFFICKING TASK FORCE, MARYLAND HUMAN TRAFFICKING
VICTIM IDENTIFICATION AND SERVICES SURVEY: RESULTS FROM CALENDAR YEAR 2014,
http://www.mdhumantrafficking.org/s/2014-MD-Human-Trafficking-Scope-and-
Services-Survey-FINAL-3123.jpg (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
9. Emerson & Aminzadeh, supra note 1, at 241; see also Mirabella, supra note 7
(explaining that “student lawyers at the University of Baltimore School of Law are
working with the Maryland Volunteer Lawyers Service to expunge or vacate such
convictions . . . to pave the way to employment for victims and end a cycle of control
and abuse.”).
10. Emerson & Aminzadeh, supra note 1, at 241.
11. As Judge Joseph Murphy explained in his treatise on evidence: “Disbelief of a witness
does not ordinarily permit the factfinder to conclude that the opposite of what the
witness testified to is true. . . .  If the witness is not believed on that point, the jurors
‘erase the blackboard.’”  JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK §
409, at 167 (4th ed. 2010); see also State v. MacArthur, 664 A.2d 68, 69 (N.H. 1994)
(holding that the trial court erred admitting as substantive evidence a pretrial,
videotaped interview of the victim to rebut the victim’s recantation at trial).
12. Consciousness of guilt can sometimes be inferred from nonassertive verbal conduct,
but “[e]vidence of a person’s silence is generally inadmissible because ‘[i]n most
circumstances silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative force.’”  Grier v.
State, 718 A.2d 211, 217 (Md. 1998) (second alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975)); see also Weitzel v. State, 863 A.2d 999,
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The rules of evidence act as the fulcrum.  This Article examines 
recent applications of the law of evidence in Maryland—specifically 
the rules pertaining to hearsay—as courts balance the rights of the 
accused with a modern understanding of the effects of abuse and 
trauma.13   
I. THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE
Our adversarial judicial system tasks the fact-finder—the jury in
many instances—with evaluating the credibility of witnesses and 
determining which facts “‘preponderate.’”14  To ensure that the fact-
finder has the most reliable, or “best evidence,” available by which to 
carry out this function, the rules of evidence serve to cull what 
evidence a fact-finder may consider.15  A trial judge applies these 
rules in his or her role as the “evidentiary sentry.”16   
A central part of this role is determining relevancy.  Maryland Rule 
5-401 defines relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
1002 (Md. 2004) (“We think the better view is that the evidence is too ambiguous to 
be probative when the ‘pre-arrest silence’ is in the presence of a police officer, and 
join the increasing number of jurisdictions that have so held.”).  Alternatively, a 
victim’s silence may take the form of the victim not testifying at trial.  In an opinion 
written by Judge Lynn Battaglia, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that, in 
such an instance, Maryland Rule 5-806 permits a defendant to impeach the credibility 
of the non-testifying hearsay declarant (the victim) through cross-examination of the 
State’s other witnesses.  Taylor v. State, 963 A.2d 197, 213 (Md. 2009).  The victim’s 
silence may also be relevant if the defendant attempts to coerce the victim to recant. 
For instance, in June 2018, Judge Michelle Hotten, on behalf of the Court of Appeals, 
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting portions of a phone 
call in which the defendant sought to get his rape victim to recant but denying the 
defendant’s attempt to admit the remainder of the phone call under the doctrine of 
completeness.  Otto v. State, 187 A.3d 47, 49 (Md. 2018).        
13. “Traumatic disorders are not new; however, contemporary understanding of disorders
and co-existing mental health conditions has recently become much more
sophisticated and nuanced.” Samantha Buckingham, Trauma Informed Juvenile
Justice, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 641, 646–47 (2016) (explaining the effects of trauma
on juvenile offenders and the criminal justice system); see also Heather Forkey,
Medical Effects of Trauma: A Guide for Lawyers, 34 CHILD L. PRAC. 97 passim
(2015) (offering several insights and practice tips to help attorneys identify and
respond to a client who may have suffered trauma).
14. T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499, 506 (1999)
(quoting GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 1 (James Sedgwick ed., 7th ed.
1805)).
15. Id. (quoting GILBERT, supra note 14, at 1–2).
16. Page v. State, 114 A.3d 283 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015).
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would be without the evidence.”17  Evidence is relevant when it is 
both material and probative.18  “Evidence is material if it bears on a 
fact of consequence to an issue in the case[,]”19 whereas “[p]robative 
value relates to the strength of the connection between the evidence 
and the issue . . . ‘to establish the proposition that it is offered to 
prove.’”20  Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible per se.21  But, under 
the rules of evidence, the converse does not apply in that not all 
relevant evidence is admissible.22  Under Maryland Rule 5-403, a 
trial court, exercising its discretion, may exclude relevant evidence if 
it believes that the probative value of the evidence is “substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”23   
In the context of abuse and trauma, evidence of a party’s or 
witness’s psychological condition may be of particular import.24  
Such evidence can help explain to the jury why someone who has 
suffered abuse may act or seem a certain way, and thereby assist the 
jury in its role as the arbiter of credibility.25  Expert witnesses and the 
17. MD. R. 5-410.
18. See Snyder v. State, 762 A.2d 125, 131 (Md. 2000).
19. Smith v. State, 98 A.3d 444, 453 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (quoting Williams v.
State, 679 A.2d 1106, 1113 (Md. 1996)).
20. Id. (quoting Williams, 679 A.2d at 1113).
21. See Perry v. Asphalt & Concrete Servs., Inc., 133 A.3d 1143, 1159 (Md. 2016) (citing
MD. R. 5-402).
22. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
23. MD. R. 5-403; see also Boyd v. State, 924 A.2d 1112, 1128 (Md. 2007) (holding that
any relevance of prior bad acts “would be slight” and outweighed by the “possibility
that the jury may have convicted Mr. Boyd because of his conduct on February 17 and
18, and July 11 and 18, 2004, rather than just his conduct on July 18th . . . .”); Graves
v. State, 637 A.2d 1197, 1203–04 (Md. 1994) (compiling cases in which relevant
evidence was held to be excludable, and holding that the probative value of
statement’s nonhearsay use “was greatly outweighed by its unfair prejudice to Graves
because of the danger of misuse of the information by the jury.”).
24. See, e.g., Wallace-Bey v. State, 172 A.3d 1006 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017) (citing
State v. Peterson, 857 A.2d 1132, 1148–49 (Md. Ct. Sec. App. 2004)) (discussing the
relevance of the psychological condition known as battered spouse syndrome as it
pertains to the mens rea elements of self-defense cases).
25. “Often the events being recalled [by trauma survivors] are distant and difficult to
express in words.  We should expect such testimony to contain some inaccuracies
without compromising the value of the testimony as a whole.”  State v. Kirby, 382
P.3d 644, 650 (Utah 2016) (quoting LYNN ABRAMS, ORAL HISTORY THEORY 94 (2d
ed. 2016)) (holding that a victim’s inconsistent testimony “could readily be
interpreted by the jury as resulting from the trauma she experienced rather than as
suggesting that she was not a credible witness”).
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statements that a victim made in seeking a medical diagnosis may 
also help elucidate these points.  But too much evidence explaining 
the witness’s point of view may amount to impermissible bolstering 
or vouching, lack relevance to the issue at hand, be cumulative or 
confusing to the jury, or prejudice the accused in some other way. 
Other rulings that attempt to protect trauma victims from reliving 
their trauma in the courtroom may deprive the accused of their 
constitutional right to confront witnesses.26  Even more challenging, 
is evidence of past behavior—either past assaults that a victim 
suffered or that an accused may have committed.  Evidence of similar 
bad acts by an accused may be so prejudicial that, even with a 
limiting instruction, jurors may still determine that the accused has a 
propensity to commit abuse.  Consider also the predicament that 
arises when a victim of abuse and trauma bonding27 changes and 
recants the story about what happened when he or she was assaulted 
by the abuser.  The victim’s contemporaneous statement becomes 
more relevant, implicating Maryland Rules 5-404(b), 5-802.1, and 5-
803(b).28   
Regardless of which evidentiary rule is at issue, Maryland Rule 5-
102 requires courts to construe the rule in a way “to secure fairness in 
administration, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and 
26. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
bars the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an
exception to the hearsay rule.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  See, e.g., Lilly v.
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 120 (1999) (discussing the purview of the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause on evidence admission); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123,
123–24, 126 (1968) (holding that the Confrontation Clause can bar the admission of
some evidence under certain circumstances).
27. Earlier this year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether a
trial court erred in admitting an expert witness on trauma bonding.  In a trial involving
multiple counts of forced labor and harboring an illegal alien for profit, the
government presented an expert witness on trauma bonding in United States v. Murra,
879 F.3d 669, 676–77 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 2018 WL 2290743 (U.S. Oct. 1,
2018) (No. 17-8924).  Dr. Shannon Wolf, a professor of psychology and counseling at
Dallas Baptist University, described trauma bonding as
[A] very powerful emotional connection between someone who is
being abused and their abuser or perhaps a captive and a captor
and it’s mitigated by a series of traumatic events, traumatic
situations. . . .  [T]he abused person not only attaches to the
abuser but to other people in the house, so they try to please this
abuser, that’s part of this relationship, and it’s one of a very strong
power differential where one person has a lot of power and the
abused person has almost no power.
Id.  The Fifth Circuit ultimately held that that the trial court’s admission of Dr. Wolf’s 
testimony did not affect the defendant’s substantive rights.  Id. at 679. 
28. See MD. R. 5-404(b), 5-802.1, 5-803(b).
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promote the growth and development of the law of evidence to the 
end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly 
determined.”29   
II. HEARSAY
A. That’s Not Hearsay
Sometimes lawyers and judges get caught up in trying to discern
which exception to the rule against hearsay applies to a statement that 
is not hearsay in the first place.30  Maryland Rule 5-801(c) defines 
hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted.”31  If a witness recounts a declaration that is 
not a “statement” or does not offer it “for the truth of the matter 
asserted[,]” courts will not exclude the testimony under the rule 
against hearsay.32  A “statement” is either “an oral or written 
29. MD. R. 5-102.
30. See generally infra notes 31–68 and accompanying text.  In August 2018, just prior to
this article’s publication, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Devincentz v.
State, 191 A.3d 373 (Md. 2018).  The Court in Devincentz discussed the admissibility
of testimony by a defendant’s son that an abuse victim was “yelling and screaming
and saying things that she could do that would get [Devincentz] in trouble.”  Id. at
396. The Court held that the statement’s “use for impeachment purposes under Md.
Rule 5-616(b)(3) was not hearsay because Devincentz offered it for the fact that the
victim made the statement—not for its truth.”  Id. at 397.  The victim’s alleged
statement was significant, the Court reasoned, “because her implied threat was
‘evidence of animus that might show a motive for making false allegations . . . .’”  Id.
(citation omitted).  Further, the Court observed that Devincentz’s son “did not detail
the contents of [the victim’s] implied threats—only that she had made them.”  Id. at
396-97.  In dissent, Judge Shirley Watts reasoned that the statement was hearsay
because it was offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted—namely, that [the
victim] could, in fact, do ‘things . . . that would get [Devincentz] in trouble.”  Id. at
402 (Watts, J., dissenting).  According to Judge Watts, this statement was offered as
direct proof of Devincentz’s theory of the case: “Simply put, Devincentz’s counsel
did not assert that [the victim] fabricated her allegations of abuse because she disliked
Devincentz or was biased against him.  Devincentz’s counsel set forth a theory of the
case that [the victim] falsely accused him of abuse because she wanted to leave the
household, and introduced [Devincentz’s son’s] testimony to prove that point.”  Id.
31. MD. R. 5-801(c).
32. Stoddard v. State, 887 A.2d 564 (Md. 2005); see also Winston v. State, 178 A.3d 643,
660 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018) (holding that a voice exemplar of a witness in which
the witness enunciated the defendant’s name as he said “Yeah, you know his name,
Stanley Winston, mon” was “not hearsay, but rather circumstantial evidence of their
familiarity with one another”), cert. denied, 183 A.3d 162 (Md. 2018); Wallace-Bey
v. State, 172 A.3d 1006, 1027–28 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017) (holding that a witness’s
recounting of a decedent’s orders and commands were not factual assertions and, thus,
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assertion” or “nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the 
person as an assertion.”33  The Rules Committee has noted, however, 
that the definition of an “assertion” is “best left to development in the 
case law,” and that Maryland Rule 5-801 “also does not attempt to 
define when an assertion, such as a verbal act, is offered for 
something other than its truth.”34  Looking to the decisional law, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals and Court of Special Appeals have 
offered greater clarity on what qualifies as an assertion.35  
Accordingly, “where the probative value of words, as offered, 
depends on the declarant having communicated a factual proposition, 
the words constitute an ‘assertion’ of that proposition.”36  
In Wallace-Bey v. State,37 the Court of Special Appeals considered 
the interplay between the rule against hearsay and a claim of 
imperfect self-defense based on battered-spouse syndrome.  Tania 
Wallace-Bey called 911 on October 24, 2007 and “reported that her 
boyfriend, Julius Whaley, had raped her and that she had shot him.”38  
“Wallace-Bey told paramedics that she had tried to kill herself by 
ingesting sleeping pills and alcohol.”39  She was taken to the hospital 
for treatment where she gave detectives oral and written statements.40   
At Wallace-Bey’s trial, there was no dispute that she shot Whaley 
to death, so the focus was on the events that led to the shooting and 
her mental state under her claim of battered-spouse syndrome.41  
not hearsay).  The same precept applies to written evidence as well.  See, e.g., Young 
v. State, 174 A.3d 481, 489–90 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017), (holding that valid
prescriptions that provide the basis of a statutory defense to charges of possession
with intent to distribute, “when properly authenticated, [are] not hearsay”), cert.
granted, 457 Md. 662 (Md. Mar. 6, 2018); Darling v. State, 158 A.3d 1065, 1082–83
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017) (holding that a phone number on a receipt linking
appellant to the crime was not hearsay because “the State did not use the receipt to
assert that appellant’s phone number was the number on the receipt”), cert. denied,
165 A.3d 462 (Md. 2017); Harris v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. City, 135 A.3d 866, 882, 883
n.15 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (concluding that an affiant’s statement that he was
unable to find employees who could remember the condition of a property during the
specific timeframe at issue was not hearsay because it was asserted to show the
trouble he had tracking down information, not to prove the truth of the employees’
statements).
33. MD. R. 5-801(a).
34. MD. R. 5-801 committee note.
35. See Stoddard, 887 A.2d at 577.
36. Id.
37. Wallace-Bey, 172 A.3d at 1006.
38. Id. at 1011.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1011–12.
41. Id. at 1012.
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During opening argument, the trial court sustained the State’s 
“hearsay” objections related to proffered testimony about what 
Whaley said to Wallace-Bey during their relationship, but overruled 
the State’s objections related to proffered testimony about what 
Whaley did to Wallace-Bey.42  Throughout her testimony about the 
abuse that she suffered, Wallace-Bey was interrupted by an objection 
whenever she started to say something like “he told me that[.]”43  The 
court sustained the State’s objection to Wallace-Bey testifying about 
text messages and emails that Whaley had sent her after she fled his 
apartment and granted the State’s motion to strike her testimony that 
Whaley ordered her to “get naked” and “you are not leaving” the 
house tonight.44  Additionally, despite the State including the same 
words in its case-in-chief, the trial court struck Wallace-Bey’s 
testimony that, “after Whaley pulled her hair and removed her 
underwear, ‘[h]e said “you need to learn to take the dick.”’”45  On 
cross-examination, when the prosecutor asked Wallace-Bey why she 
did not leave the apartment on the occasion when Whaley had put her 
in a headlock, she was constrained to answer: “[B]ecause I’m barred 
from saying what he said, I will say that he said things that led me to 
believe that he would harm me if I moved.”46  Following her direct 
testimony, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, “contend[ing] that 
the court’s restrictions on Wallace-Bey’s testimony impaired her 
constitutional right to present evidence in her defense[,]” and 
“prevented her from presenting evidence of psychological abuse that 
was relevant to the issue of battered spouse syndrome.”47 
Wallace-Bey challenged these decisions on appeal, arguing in main 
part that “the trial court[’s rulings] deprived the jury of critical 
information it needed to meaningfully consider” her self-defense 
42. Id.  At the outset of the defense’s case, the State made a motion in limine to exclude
as hearsay, any testimony by Wallace-Bey of any statements made to her by Whaley.
Id. at 1015.  Defense counsel argued that the statements made by Whaley to Wallace-
Bey were not offered for the truth of the statements but rather, for their effect on
Wallace-Bey—“‘to show how those statements affected her mental state and her
decision-making process[.]’”  Id. (alteration in original).  Without providing a
rationale, the court granted the State’s motion, and the clerk made an entry in the
docket stating that the court granted motion “‘that any Statements of [the] Victim are
Hearsay[.]’”  Id. at 1016 (alteration in original).
43. Id. at 1018–19.
44. Id. at 1019.
45. Id. (alteration in original).
46. Id. at 1020 (alteration in original).
47. Id. at 1019–20.
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claims.48  She insisted that she offered her testimony to show the 
effect that her boyfriend’s comments had on her and how those 
comments “instilled in her a sense of fear and coercive control by 
Whaley.”49  Further, she contended his comments to her “w[ere] 
admissible as evidence of ‘psychological abuse’ in addition to the 
physical and sexual assaults [she suffered].”50 
Judge Kevin Arthur, writing for the Court, determined that the trial 
court “committed prejudicial error by requiring Wallace-Bey to 
present the evidence that the victim [Whaley] repeatedly abused her 
without mentioning any words that he actually said to her.”51  Judge 
Arthur began by explaining that the categorical ruling, on the State’s 
request, prohibiting Wallace-Bey from testifying to any words 
Whaley said to her “vastly exceeded the scope of the rule against 
hearsay.”52  He continued: 
Aside from identifying Whaley as the declarant, the State 
offered no details about any of the declarations that it sought 
to exclude.  The State supplied no information for the court 
to evaluate whether any of the unspecified declarations were 
“assertion[s]” by Whaley and thus “statement[s]” within the 
meaning of Rule 5-801(a).  The State insisted that Whaley’s 
words would be “offered for the truth,” but said nothing 
about what “truth” Whaley was asserting or what “truth” 
Wallace-Bey would be attempting to prove.  The State did 
not come anywhere close to meeting its burden . . . .  The 
court should have summarily denied the State’s unfounded 
motion.53 
Reciting Judge Charlie Moylan’s observation that lawyers seem to 
have “a Pavlovian reflex . . . to leap to their feet and yell, ‘Hearsay!’” 
whenever a witness testifies “to words spoken by some other person 
on some other occasion,”54 Judge Arthur annunciated the point that 
“a trial court should never exclude evidence as hearsay solely 
because a witness attempts to testify about something that someone 
allegedly said outside of the courtroom.”55  Citing Professor 
48. Id. at 1022.
49. Id. at 1026.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1011.
52. Id. at 1026–27.
53. Id. at 1027 (first and second alteration in original).
54. Id. (quoting Holland v. State, 713 A.2d 364, 369 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998)).
55. Id.
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McLain,56 Judge Arthur noted that “[i]n general, orders and 
commands are not factual assertions.”57  Focusing in on the State’s 
objections during Wallace-Bey’s testimony, the Court held: 
To the extent that the two declarations “get naked” and “you 
are not leaving” were orders, they were not assertions.  To 
the extent that those declarations included any assertions, 
Wallace-Bey did not offer that evidence to prove that what 
Whaley said was true.  The words “get naked,” might 
conceivably be hearsay if offered to prove through 
implication that the target of the command was wearing 
clothes when the command was given.  In the context of this 
case, however, Wallace-Bey offered that evidence to 
recount how Whaley demanded to have sex with her that 
night.  Wallace-Bey testified that Whaley said “you are not 
leaving” in response to questions about what Whaley did 
that night to dissuade her from leaving.  The probative value 
of the testimony did not depend on Whaley’s sincerity or 
accuracy.  As defense counsel correctly argued, her 
testimony was probative to explain how Whaley’s words 
affected her.58 
The Court further held that the trial court erred in sustaining the 
State’s hearsay objection and striking Wallace-Bey’s testimony that 
Whaley told her she needs to “learn to take the dick” just before 
raping her on the morning of the killing: 
Even if Whaley’s alleged remark were an assertion of some 
kind, defense counsel certainly was not offering that 
testimony to prove the “truth” of whatever vile message he 
was allegedly asserting.  Defense counsel introduced that 
statement to show how Wallace-Bey understood that 
Whaley was going to rape her at that time.  The decision to 
strike that testimony was particularly aberrant, because 
Wallace-Bey’s testimony about those words was important 
to evaluating her perception that Whaley would assault her 
again when she shot him minutes later.59 
56. 6A LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE & FEDERAL § 801:4, at 188 (3d ed.
2013).
57. Wallace-Bey, 172 A.2d at 1027 (citing MCLAIN, supra note 56, at 188 n.4).
58. Id. at 1028.
59. Id.
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The Court rejected the State’s argument that Wallace-Bey’s 
testimony should not be admissible because it was “unfair” that 
Whaley was dead and therefore, unavailable to rebut Wallace-Bey’s 
testimony.60  The Court explained that “[t]he Maryland Rules do not 
bar admission of nonhearsay” for this reason.61  The Court reasoned 
that “Wallace-Bey is competent to testify about things that she claims 
to have personally heard Whaley say to her for the purpose of 
explaining how those words affected her[,]” and that she may recount 
his exact words for that purpose if she remembers them.62  It is then 
up to the State to rebut her account of events through cross-
examination and for the jury to ultimately decide what to believe.63   
Specifically with respect to a defendant who raises the defense of 
battered-spouse syndrome, the Court noted that words spoken by the 
victim-abuser “can be particularly probative.”64  “All three phases of 
the cycle of violence at the center of the syndrome may involve 
words in addition to actions: expressions of hostility during the 
tension-building phase; ‘verbal aggression’ during acute battering 
incidents; and apologies, requests for forgiveness, and promises to 
change in the contrition phase.”65  The Court found further support in 
the Maryland Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article (CJP), § 10-916(b)(1), which permits a defendant 
who asserts the defense of battered-spouse syndrome “to introduce 
not only evidence of ‘physical’ abuse but also evidence of 
‘psychological abuse of the defendant’ by the victim.”66  Because the 
issue of battered-spouse syndrome is available even when the abuse 
is, at times, only psychological, the Court reasoned that “verbal 
conduct may be evidence of psychological abuse[,]” and, therefore, 
“the words allegedly spoken by Whaley to Wallace-Bey were 
essential to explaining the nature of her psychological abuse.”67   
Finally, the Court held that the trial court “duplicated its earlier 
error by continuing to rule that everything spoken by Whaley to 
Wallace-Bey was inadmissible hearsay” and excluding as “double 





65. Id. (citing State v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429, 441 (Md. 2004)).
66. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916(b)(1) (West 2018)).
67. Id. (citing State v. Peterson, 857 A.2d 1132, 1135, 1150–52 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2004)).
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hearsay” testimony by Dr. McGraw, the expert forensic 
psychologist.68  We address the latter issue within this article.  
B. Spontaneous Statements
Once a court establishes that a relevant, non-privileged out-of-court
statement is being offered to prove the truth of the facts asserted, then 
of course, it must be excluded unless one or more exceptions to the 
rule against hearsay apply.69  “The exceptions to the hearsay rule are 
derived from the principle that under certain circumstances, ‘the 
statement offered is free enough from the risk of inaccuracy and 
untrustworthiness, so that the test of cross-examination would be 
superfluous.’”70 
One such exception to the rule against hearsay that courts in 
Maryland recognize is for “excited utterance.”71  In the context of 
sexual assault and trauma, this exception is often considered in 
conjunction with another exception—the exception for prompt 
reports of sexual assault.72  For instance, in Cooper v. State, the Court 
of Appeals considered whether a trial court erred in admitting the 
testimony of a rape victim’s roommate and that of an investigating 
officer because the testimony included hearsay statements that the 
victim made to those witnesses.73  The victim’s roommate testified, 
over the defense’s hearsay objection, that the victim “woke me out of 
my sleep” and “after I talked to her for a while because she was like 
crying and emotional, she told me she had been raped.”74  The 
roommate’s testimony also related the victim’s description of how 
the rape occurred.75  Similarly, the investigating officer testified that 
when he met the victim “approximately an hour” after the sexual 
assault occurred, “she was emotional and at times tearful.”76  He then 
68. Id. at 1030.
69. See, e.g., MD. R. 5-101(d); MD. R. 5-402; MD. R. 5-801(c); MD. R. 5-802.
70. State v. Coates, 950 A.2d 114, 121 (Md. 2008) (brackets omitted) (quoting JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 1420, at 251 (James H.
Chadbourn rev. ed., 1974)).
71. MD. R. 5-803(b)(2).
72. MD. R. 5-802.1(d).  See also Muhammad v. State, 115 A.3d 742, 751 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2015) (holding that a witness’s testimony “exceeded the bounds of a prompt
complaint of sexual assault” by impermissibly corroborating the victim’s narrative of
events surrounding the assault).
73. Cooper v. State, 73 A.3d 1108, 1124 (Md. 2013).
74. Id. at 1125.
75. Id. at 1125–26.
76. Id. at 1126.
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also related the victim’s description of the rape.77  In response to the 
defense’s objections at trial, the State argued that the victim’s 
statements were admissible as excited utterances and as “a prompt 
report of sexual assaultive behavior.”78  
When the case reached the Court of Appeals, that Court concluded 
that it need not consider the applicability of the exception for 
“prompt reports” of sexual assault victims under Maryland Rule 5-
802.1(d) because the hearsay statements at issue were admissible as 
excited utterances.79  The Court explained that “when introducing a 
hearsay statement under the excited utterance exception, ‘[t]he 
proponent of a statement purporting to fall within the excited 
utterance exception must establish the foundation for admissibility, 
namely personal knowledge and spontaneity.’”80  Analyzing whether 
the testimony at issue met these requirements for admissibility, the 
Court reasoned that “there is no question that Victim had personal 
knowledge about the details of her attack when she spoke to 
Roommate and [the officer].  She was the victim of the attack.”81  
The Court held that spontaneity, the second factor, was also met.82  
For this factor, the Court looked to the totality of the circumstances 
and concluded that there were sufficient facts “to indicate that when 
Victim told Roommate and [the officer] respectively about her attack 
she was ‘still emotionally engulfed by the situation,’ such that her 
statements about her attack were ‘excited utterances.’”83  Of the 
“many factors” considered in the totality of the circumstances, 
“‘[p]robably the most important . . . is the time factor.’”84  The Court 
emphasized that both witnesses testified that the victim was still very 
emotional when she recounted her rape, which had just occurred less 
than an hour beforehand.85  It concluded that, under the 
circumstances, 
it was not a legal error or an abuse of discretion for the trial 
judge to admit statements made by Victim as excited 
utterances when she had been sexually assaulted 
approximately one hour earlier, her demeanor was such that 
77. Id. at 1126–27.
78. Id. at 1126.
79. Id. at 1124–25.




83. Id. at 1127 (quoting State v. Harrell, 702 A.2d 723, 727 (Md. 1997)).
84. Id. at 1128 (quoting Cassidy v. State, 536 A.2d 666, 674 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988)).
85. Id.
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she was “tearful” and “emotional,” she was still wearing the 
same clothing she wore at the time of the attack, and she 
was distraught when speaking to a detective after having 
been brought to a hospital to be examined physically and 
questioned concerning the attack.86 
C. State of Mind
As Judge Arthur pointed out in Wallace-Bey, out-of-court
statements made to an abuse victim may be probative, not to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted, but to explain how the words affect 
the victim’s state of mind.87  For instance, in Copeland v. State, the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland considered whether the trial 
court erred in admitting a victim’s testimony of the threats that her 
boyfriend, the appellant, made to her and her family.88  The State 
charged Copeland with kidnapping, second-degree assault, false 
imprisonment, and carrying a dangerous weapon following his arrest 
after he drove away from the scene of an almost-accident with his 
hand around the neck of his girlfriend, Ms. Nesmith, who was seated 
in the passenger seat.89  According to Ms. Nesmith, Copeland pulled 
a knife on her and forced her to drive him to the house of a friend 
with whom he suspected her of having an affair.90  After Ms. 
Nesmith nearly struck an oncoming vehicle, the driver of that vehicle 
observed her stop the car and fall out into the road; the other driver 
then saw Copeland grab and force her back into the car before 
Copeland drove off.91  Ms. Nesmith said that Copeland told her “you 
know what I’m going to do to you now[,]” as he continued to drive 
with his hand around her throat.92  Officer Browning, who was 
86. Id. at 1128–29.
87. See Wallace-Bey v. State, 172 A.3d 1006, 1028 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017).
88. Copeland v. State, 9 A.3d 155, 158 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010).  In some
circumstances, out-of-court statements to prove circumstantial evidence of a
declarant’s state of mind may be admissible as non-hearsay evidence.  See, e.g.,
Holland v. State, 713 A.2d 364, 370–71 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (holding that
testimony that alleged co-conspirator expressed an intent to go “down the strip to sell”
to be admissible non-hearsay circumstantial evidence that the conspirators “were
operating collectively and not individually”); Kinser v. State, 591 A.2d 894, 896 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (citation omitted) (holding that evidence of a crowd’s words
demonstrated appellant’s own state of mind because for a considerable period of time,
he was in the crowd as an active participant).
89. Copeland, 9 A.3d at 156–57.
90. Id. at 157.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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finally able to pull over Copeland and arrest him, testified that Ms. 
Nesmith was hesitant to cooperate with police initially, but after a 
few minutes, told him that she was afraid that Copeland would hurt 
her and her family if she cooperated.93 
A jury convicted Copeland of second-degree assault.94  He 
appealed, arguing, among other things, that Officer Browning’s 
testimony about “Ms. Nesmith’s expression of fear that appellant 
would hurt her or her family constituted inadmissible hearsay,” and 
did not fit into any hearsay exception listed in Maryland Rule 5-
803.95  The Court of Special Appeals disagreed, holding that Officer 
Browning’s testimony was admissible under Rule 5-803(b)(3) as a 
statement of Ms. Nesmith’s then-existing state of mind.96  In so 
holding, the Court noted that, most frequently, the exception under 
Rule 5-803(b)(3) applies to prove intent to engage in future content, 
but that “[h]ere, the testimony was admissible to prove the witness’s 
then existing state of mind, i.e., fear, to prove the truth of the stated 
reason for the fear, i.e., a threat by appellant.”97 
D. Business Records
Especially in family law cases, courts are often presented with
reports that are largely founded on hearsay.98  In Denningham v. 
Denningham,99 Judge Alan Wilner, writing for the Court of Special 
Appeals, described custody evaluation reports as consisting “largely 
of hearsay declarations often double- or triple-level hearsay as well 
as opinions of various social workers, medical or paramedical 
personnel, psychologists, teachers, and the like, which may or may 
not have a reasonable basis.”100  He pointed out that the statements 
contained in these reports “have no special indicia of reliability[,]” as 
the statements are not under oath and are often made by persons who 
have “overt or covert bias.”101  Judge Wilner instructed that “[t]heir 
usefulness to the court is only as strong as their reliability, and that 
93. Id. at 157–58.
94. Id. at 158.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 159.
98. See, e.g., Leary v. Leary, 627 A.2d 30, 41 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993), abrogated on
other grounds by Fox v. Wills, 890 A.2d 726, 728–29, 734, 737 (Md. 2006).
99. Denningham v. Denningham, 431 A.2d 755 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
100. Id. at 759.
101. Id.
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requires that they be subject to challenge in essentially the same 
manner as any other critical evidence.”102  
Last year, in In re: Adoption/Guardianship of T.A., Jr.,103 the Court 
of Special Appeals considered whether the business records 
exception104 applied to an exhibit containing five reports that Court 
Medical Services created in preparation for a child in need of 
assistance (CINA) proceeding: (1) a bonding evaluation of the child 
and its adoptive parents, (2) a parental fitness evaluation of the 
biological mother, (3) a parental fitness evaluation of the biological 
father, (4) a fitness evaluation of the adoptive parents, and (5) a 
bonding evaluation of the biological parents and the child.105  The 
biological father appealed the juvenile court’s decision to admit the 
exhibit into evidence, arguing that the reports contained inadmissible 
hearsay.106  Judge Dan Friedman, writing for the Court, first observed 
that the exception “allows for the admission of a report (memoranda, 
record, or data), despite the report being hearsay, if it was created in 
the regular course of business by a person with knowledge of the 
event at or near the time of the event.”107  The report must be of a 
type that is kept in the regular practice of that business.108  The Court 
held that “[r]eports created by Court Medical Services for review in 
child access cases do not qualify for the business records 
exception.”109  Judge Friedman reasoned as follows: 
It is clear from In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 
95195062/CAD,[110] that Father is correct in each of his 
arguments.  First, the reports contained in Exhibit 91 “had 
nothing to do with the ‘running’ of the Juvenile Court 
Medical Service.”  Second, the reports contained in Exhibit 
91 were the opinions of Dr. Zajdel and Ms. Harriel and, 
therefore are “qualitatively different” from the information 
typically contained in a business record.  And finally, “as a 
matter of fundamental fairness,” Father should have been 
102. Id.
103. In re Adoption/Guardianship of T.A., Jr., 168 A.3d 1071 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017).
104. In Maryland, Rule 5-803(b)(6) provides an exception for “[r]ecords of regularly
conducted business activity.”  MD. R. 5-803(b)(6).
105. In re Adoption/Guardianship of T.A., Jr., 168 A.3d at 1076–77.
106. Id. at 1076.
107. Id. at 1077 (citing MD. R. 5-803(b)(6)).
108. Id. (quoting MD. R. 5-803(b)(6)).
109. Id. (citation omitted).
110. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 95195062, 696 A.2d 1102 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1997).
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allowed to cross-examine Dr. Zajdel and Ms. Harriel about 
the reports contained in Exhibit 91.  As a result, the reports 
contained in Exhibit 91 do not qualify for the business 
records exception.  Moreover, although the parties have 
conceded here that Exhibit 91 is hearsay, and although In re 
Adoption/Guardianship No. 95195062/CAD expressly held 
twenty years ago that such reports are inadmissible hearsay, 
we now repeat that Exhibit 91, and reports like them, do not 
meet the requirement of the business records exception.111 
As Judge Friedman noted, however, in certain proceedings the 
“relaxed rules”112 of evidence under Maryland Rule 5-101(c) permit 
the court, “in the interest of justice,” to “decline to require strict 
application of the rules . . . .”113  
E. Expert Testimony and Rules 5-802.1 and 5-803
The Court of Appeals of Maryland opined on the value of expert
testimony to support a defense of battered-spouse syndrome in its 
2017 decision in Porter v. State.114  “When a woman uses physical 
force to defend against her abuser, expert witness testimony 
explaining the effects of battered spouse syndrome can be crucial to a 
successful self-defense claim.”115  Judge Sally Adkins, writing for the 
majority, explained that expert witness testimony is important 
because it “offers an explanation of why the defendant, having been 
previously subjected to abuse, simply did not leave the home or take 
some other action against her abuser,”116,117 and “[i]t also helps 
111. In re Adoption/Guardianship of T.A., Jr., 168 A.3d at 1078 (footnote omitted)
(citations omitted) (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 95195062, 696 A.2d at
1112).
112. Id. at 1078 n.4.
113. Id. (quoting MD. R. 5-101(c)).  Maryland Rule 5-101(c) permits “the court, in the
interest of justice,” to “decline to require strict applications of the rules” in certain
circumstances, including: “[p]roceedings for revocation of probation,” “[d]isposition
hearings . . . including permanency planning hearings,” and hearings to modify child
custody or visitation conducted pursuant to Maryland Rule 11-116.  MD. R. 5-101(c).
114. Porter v. State, 166 A.3d 1044 (Md. 2017).
115. Id. at 1054.
116. Id. (quoting State v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429, 441 (Md. 2004)).  In July 2018, the
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of a father charged with sexually abusing
his daughter, holding that the State’s expert witness impermissibly endorsed the
credibility of the victim’s out-of-court statements.  See Fallin v. State, 188 A.3d 988,
990 (Md. 2018).  The expert had opined that the victim showed no “signs of
fabrication or coaching” and said that she had no concerns about fabrication in pretrial
interviews with the alleged victim.  Id.  The Court reasoned that an expert may
provide the jury with “expert information on some signs of fabrication or coaching
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explain to the jury ‘why, though apparently the aggressor, the 
defendant was actually responding to a perceived aggression by the 
victim.’”118  Relying on the Court’s prior decision in Smullen, Judge 
Adkins reiterated that in an abusive relationship, “the victim becomes 
able to sense the escalation in the frequency and intensity of the 
violence and thus becomes more sensitive to the abuser's 
behavior.”119  Therefore, she can recognize the severity of the threat 
with greater certainty, and “[s]he is able to ‘recognize a threat of 
imminent danger from conduct that would not appear imminently 
threatening to someone who had not been subjected to that repetitive 
cycle of violence.’”120  
Regarding evidence admissible under the battered-spouse 
syndrome statute, the Court noted: “[E]xpert testimony regarding the 
cycle of violence in an abusive relationship can explain to the jury 
how a woman might actually fear imminent danger during a break 
between violent episodes.”121  Returning to its prior decision in 
Smullen, the Court emphasized the importance of an expert witness 
in helping the jury understand the psychology of a battered spouse: 
[E]xpert testimony regarding battered spouse syndrome
helps the jury evaluate whether the defendant could have
safely retreated by describing “why the defendant, having
they might look for,” so the jury could form its own judgment of the victim’s 
credibility.  Id. at 1003.  But, the Court concluded, the expert’s testimony in Fallin 
was more akin to an inadmissible polygraph exam determining indications of 
deception.  Id. at 1005. 
117. In 2016, the Court of Appeals of New York iterated its position on the admissibility of
expert testimony to explain the behavior of trauma victims:
We have previously held that expert testimony on [Child Sexual 
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome] is admissible, like other 
psychological syndromes, because it helps to explain victim 
behavior that might be puzzling to the jury.  The expert educates 
the jury on a scientifically-recognized “pattern of secrecy, 
helplessness, entrapment [and] accommodation” experienced by 
the child victim.  This includes assisting the jury to understand 
“why a child may wait a long time before reporting the alleged 
abuse,” fail to report at all, and deny or recant claims of sexual 
assault.  
People v. Nicholson, 48 N.E.3d 944, 954 (N.Y. 2016) (second alteration in original) 
(citations omitted) (holding that an expert was appropriate to assist the jury to 
understand why a child victim would wait ten years to come forward). 
118. Porter, 166 A.3d at 1054 (quoting Smullen, 844 A.2d at 451).
119. Id. at 1054–55 (quoting Smullen, 844 A.2d at 441–42).
120. Id. at 1055 (quoting Smullen, 844 A.2d at 451).
121. Id. at 1059.
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been previously subjected to abuse, simply did not leave the 
home or take some other action against her abuser.”  
Holding that Porter has not put forth evidence that she 
believed she was in “imminent or immediate danger” 
because she had time to pursue other options to avoid the 
abuse would contradict our explanation of battered spouse 
syndrome.  We admit expert testimony as to battered spouse 
syndrome in part to thwart the assumption that if the 
relationship was truly abusive, the woman would have left 
or sought help from law enforcement.122 
The Court of Special Appeals in Wallace-Bey, discussed more fully 
above, also opined on an expert’s ability to testify about a 
defendant’s history of abuse.123  Although the battered-spouse 
syndrome statute does not make this specific type of evidence 
admissible, the Court reasoned that “[e]vidence of that kind of abuse 
. . . could still be admissible under some other provision or theory of 
relevance.”124  Wallace-Bey’s contention on appeal focused on a 
report by Dr. McGraw that “ma[de] it clear that Wallace-Bey’s 
exposure to traumatic experiences, including childhood sexual abuse, 
was a cornerstone of Dr. McGraw’s conclusion about how battered 
spouse syndrome affected Wallace-Bey’s actions during the 
shooting.”125  In the report, “Dr. McGraw opined that Wallace-Bey’s 
history of abuse made her vulnerable to being in a relationship in 
which she ‘re-experienced the pattern of domestic violence she had 
been exposed to in childhood[,]’” and that “medical literature 
indicates that a history of being battered can have a ‘direct effect’ on 
a battered woman’s ‘state of mind and her appraisal of danger[.]’”126  
“Dr. McGraw added that persons with long histories of trauma 
respond to threats ‘in the context of the sum total of their total 
traumatic life experiences’ and that the ‘cumulative effect of 
violence’ can ‘severely alter[]’ a person’s ‘ability to cope with a 
threat[.]’”127   
The Court concluded that Wallace-Bey had established the 
relevance of the past abuse she suffered by linking it “to the basis for 
Dr. McGraw’s expert opinion.”128  Because her attorney did not 
122. Id. at 1061 (citation omitted).
123. See infra notes 124–32 and accompanying text.
124. Wallace-Bey v. State, 172 A.3d 1006, 1033 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017).
125. Id. at 1034.
126. Id. (second alteration in original).
127. Id. (alteration in original).
128. Id.
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articulate this theory of relevancy to the trial court, however, the 
Court instructed as follows: 
 On remand, if Wallace-Bey offers evidence that she was 
abused by persons other than Whaley as the foundation for 
an expert opinion about how that abuse affected her 
psychological condition and mental state, and if defense 
counsel articulates the theory of relevance that she advanced 
in this appeal, then the trial court should admit the evidence 
for that purpose over the State’s relevancy objection.129   
Recognizing that the trial court may still exclude relevant 
testimony, the Court then explained that the probative value of past-
abuse evidence “largely depends on how important (or unimportant) 
those facts were in the expert’s ultimate evaluation.”130  The Court 
instructed that the trial court should weigh probative value against the 
countervailing factors (unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence) “to decide in the first instance 
exactly how much testimony of prior abuse to admit.”131  The Court 
concluded, “evidence should be admitted to the extent that it is 
necessary for the jury to understand and to meaningfully evaluate the 
expert opinions.”132 
The Wallace-Bey Court also addressed the admissibility of 
statements alleged to be hearsay contained within an expert witness’s 
report.133  Judge Arthur reasoned that even though Dr. McGraw’s 
testimony “involved two out-of-court declarants, with Dr. McGraw 
recounting Wallace-Bey’s report of what Whaley said, the excluded 
testimony did not contain hearsay within hearsay” because “[i]t 
included no hearsay from Whaley.”134  He continued, “Wallace-Bey 
was not attempting to prove that Whaley spoke the truth when he 
allegedly called her an ‘[un]suitable mate’ or said that she was 
‘tainted and flawed.’  Nor was she attempting to prove the truth of 
Whaley’s alleged claims that he was ‘divinely ordained’ and ‘the 
police of God.’”135  Rather, “[t]he defense offered testimony about 
129. Id. at 1034–35.
130. Id. at 1035.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See infra notes 134–39 and accompanying text.
134. Wallace-Bey, 172 A.3d at 1030.
135. Id. (alteration in original).
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those comments for the appropriate purpose of illuminating Dr. 
McGraw’s opinion about psychological abuse from Whaley that 
Wallace-Bey suffered.”136  Therefore, the “evidence ‘would have 
provided the jury a much fuller picture’ of the basis for Dr. 
McGraw’s opinion[,]” and the trial court’s ruling made it easier for 
the State to promote the contrary conclusion of its own expert 
witness.137  Because of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, “[t]he 
jury heard a muted version of the defense case instead of the version 
that Wallace-Bey had the right to present under Maryland law.”138  
The Court concluded: “In a case where the verdict depended on the 
jury’s assessment of Wallace-Bey’s credibility and the relative 
weight to be assigned to the competing expert opinions, we cannot 
come anywhere close to saying that the erroneous hearsay rulings had 
no effect on the outcome.”139 
F. Tender Years Exception
Maryland Rule 5-802 acknowledges that the legislature may
provide statutory exceptions to the rule against hearsay.140  Recently, 
in In re: J.J., the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered the 
admissibility of an out-of-court statement of a nine-year-old under 
the “tender years exception” found at § 11–304 of the Criminal 
Procedure (CP) Article of the Maryland Code.141  The statute applies 
in criminal cases and juvenile court proceedings, including CINA 
proceedings.142 
In re: J.J. was a CINA proceeding.143  Prior to the adjudicatory 
hearing in that case, the juvenile court conducted a separate 
admissibility hearing under CP § 11–304 after the county department 
of social services gave notice that it sought to introduce J.J.’s audio-
recorded forensic interview conducted at the Peninsula Regional 
Medical Center in which J.J. described how she was sexually abused 
by her father.144  Ms. Tiffany Gattis, a licensed clinical social worker, 
testified that she conducted the interview using a forensic interview 
method knows as Rapport, Anatomy, Touch, Abuse, and Closure 
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1032.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See MD. R. 5-802 (stating that hearsay is inadmissible except as “permitted by . . .
statutes”).
141. In re J.J., 174 A.3d 372, 374–75 (Md. 2017), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 428 (2018).
142. See id. at 374.
143. See id. at 374–75.
144. Id. at 377.
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(RATAC).145  Ms. Gattis, who at the time had interviewed 
approximately 3500 children in her work at the Child Advocacy 
Center, gave detailed testimony about J.J.’s demeanor and the 
reasons why she believed the child’s testimony was credible.146  On 
cross-examination, she acknowledged that she did not discuss 
“truthfulness” with J.J. during the interview because it was not part 
of the RATAC protocol.147   
Under CP § 11–304(g)(1)-(2), the court is directed to examine the 
child victim when determining the particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness148 and admissibility of the child’s statement unless 
“the court determines that an audio or visual recording of the child 
victim's statement makes an examination of the child victim 
unnecessary.”149  After hearing the testimony offered by Ms. Gattis 
and listening to the recording, the juvenile court concluded that it 
would not examine J.J. as part of its determination, having decided 
that “the audio recording of the child makes an examination of the 
child victim unnecessary in this case.”150  The court explained 
further, “I don't think it would add to my ability to determine whether 
that statement made back [in August] in light of the questioning had 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  So I'm not going to 
interview the child.”151 
Next, the juvenile court addressed the admissibility of J.J.'s 
statement for the truth of the matter asserted if she did not testify at 
the adjudication hearing.152  Pursuant to CP § 11–304(d)(2)(ii), “a 
child victim’s out-of-court statement is admissible when the child 
does not testify ‘only if there is corroborative evidence that the 
alleged offender had the opportunity to commit the alleged abuse or 
neglect.’”153  The juvenile court found that there was “corroborative 
evidence that Mr. J. had the opportunity to sexually abuse J.J., given 
his pre-hearing statement against interest to Ms. Gattis that he was 
alone with the children on the dates of the alleged abuse[.]”154  
145. Id.
146. See id. at 378.
147. Id. at 379.
148. A child’s out-of-court statement is admissible to prove the matter asserted “only if the
statement has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
PROC. § 11-304(e)(1) (West 2017).
149. Id. § 11-304(g)(1)(ii).
150. In re J.J., 174 A.3d at 379.
151. Id. (alteration in original).
152. Id.
153. Id. (MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304(d)(2)(ii) (West 2017)).
154. Id. at 380.
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The juvenile court heard from all parties on the thirteen factors set 
forth in CP § 11–304 for determining the admissibility of J.J.’s out-
of-court statement.155  The court found, among other things, that the 
“child has great personal knowledge of the event[,]” and that “[t]here 
was some spontaneity in the answers.  Most of them were directly 
responsive to questions.”156  The court also found that “[t]he timing 
of the statement is very proximate to the most recent abuse which 
was the night before . . . [a]nd what she described would be beyond 
the child victim’s expected knowledge and experience except for, 
unfortunately, for this child victim, she is a prior victim of sex 
abuse.”157  After reviewing and rendering findings under each factor, 
the juvenile court determined that the statement was admissible.158   
Before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners—J.J.’s parents—
argued that the juvenile court erred in admitting the out-of-court 
statement for the truth of the matter asserted because the court failed 
to determine whether the child understood the distinction between 
155. Id.  The statute directs that in determining whether the statement at issue has
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” the juvenile court “shall consider, but
is not limited to,” the following factors enumerated factors:
(i) the child victim’s personal knowledge of the event;
(ii) the certainty that the statement was made;
(iii) any apparent motive to fabricate or exhibit partiality by the
child victim, including interest, bias, corruption, or coercion;
(iv) whether the statement was spontaneous or directly responsive
to questions;
(v) the timing of the statement;
(vi) whether the child victim’s young age makes it unlikely that
the child victim fabricated the statement that represents a graphic,
detailed account beyond the child victim’s expected knowledge
and experience;
(vii) the appropriateness of the terminology of the statement to the
child victim’s age;
(viii) the nature and duration of the abuse or neglect;
(ix) the inner consistency and coherence of the statement;
(x) whether the child victim was suffering pain or distress when
making the statement;
(xi) whether extrinsic evidence exists to show the defendant or
child respondent had an opportunity to commit the act complained
of in the child victim’s statement;
(xii) whether the statement was suggested by the use of leading
questions; and
(xiii) the credibility of the person testifying about the statement.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304(e) (West 2017).
156. See In re J.J., 174 A.3d at 380.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 382.
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truth and falsehood.159  Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera, writing for 
the Court of Appeals, however, noted “that CP § 11–304 is silent on 
whether a juvenile court must make a truth-competency 
determination prior to ruling on the admissibility of a child’s out-of-
court statement[,]” and determined that the legislative history 
confirmed that the General Assembly did not intend to impose such a 
requirement.160  Moreover, Chief Judge Barbera explained: 
[A] preliminary competency determination is irrelevant to a
juvenile court’s admissibility determination.  There has been
no showing, nor do we conclude, that the statute’s existing
thirteen-factor trustworthiness test would be enhanced by
requiring examination of a non-testifying child’s
competency.  Rather, CP § 11–304 imposes multiple
conditions that must be satisfied prior to a juvenile court’s
determination that the statement is admissible: the court
must make a finding as to whether (1) it is unnecessary to
examine the child; (2) there is corroborative evidence that
the alleged abuser had an opportunity to commit the abuse;
and (3) the child’s statement contains “particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.”161
The Court also addressed the mother’s argument that the out-of-
court statement did not possess particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness for various reasons, including that it was not 
“consistently repeated” and cited Idaho v. Wright.162  The Court 
rejected the mother’s contention, pointing out that the decision in 
Crawford v. Washington163 replaced Wright as the seminal case on 
confrontation.164  According to the Court, Wright applied only in the 
criminal context and Maryland courts have held that the right to 
159. Id. at 374–75.
160. Id. at 384–85.
161. Id. at 385.
162. Id. at 386 (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821–22 (1990)).  In Wright, the
Supreme Court held that hearsay statements of child victims lacked particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness required for admission under the Confrontation Clause
and that “consistent repetition” is a factor to consider in determining the reliability of
such statements.  See Wright, 497 U.S. at 821–22, 826–27.
163. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
164. In re J.J., 174 A.3d at 387 (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 805; then citing Crawford, 541
U.S. at 36).
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confrontation does not apply in CINA proceedings or civil 
proceedings generally.165, 166     
III. CONCLUSION
The cases discussed in this Article were selected to illustrate the
challenges presented in cases involving victims and witnesses 
suffering from trauma and abuse.167  The cases demonstrate that 
courts may rely on the rules of evidence and their common law 
antecedents, as well as the opinions of experts when necessary, to 
provide the fact-finder with the best evidence.168  The more that the 
bench and the bar are cognizant of the manifestations of abuse and 
trauma, the more we can guarantee equitable outcomes for everyone 
participating in the legal system.169 
165. Id. at 387–88 (citations omitted).
166. See also Tyler v. State, 679 A.2d 1127, 1131 n.4 (Md. 1996) (“In a civil case, there is
no need to protect the defendant’s right of confrontation.”); In re Colin R., 493 A.2d
1083, 1087–88 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (“The instant case is a juvenile C.I.N.A.
proceeding, not a criminal prosecution, and the right of confrontation . . . is not
available to the parents of an alleged C.I.N.A.”).
167. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 24–25, 28, 114–18 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
